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“The lesson is clear: we do not solve this problem merely by identifying it.”1
INTRODUCTION

The year 2015 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first DNA exoneration in the
United States. In the last twenty-five years, the Innocence Movement has succeeded in achieving
thousands of additional exonerations while bringing about significant reform in the criminal
justice system. These reforms have sought to address the primary causes of wrongful convictions,
including eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, and flawed forensic science. However,
while pre-trial and investigatory policy changes have begun to take hold, very few comparable
systemic procedural reforms have been implemented in the post-conviction context. In fact, in
1996, on the eve of the Innocent Movement, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”]. Rather than seeking to alter post-conviction procedure to more
effectively address viable claims of innocence, AEDPA operated to radically restrict federal
habeas review for state prisoners. Nowhere is AEDPA’s impact more devastating than in the
context of factually innocence prisoners seeking review of their wrongful convictions.
Under AEDPA’s provisions, prisoners are subject to an unyielding one-year filing period
widely regarded as unreasonable, and the standard for establishing innocence is onerous to the
point of being virtually insurmountable. Indeed, of the first 250 DNA exonerations stemming
from the Innocence Movement, not a single prisoner succeeded in raising a post-conviction claim
of innocence via federal habeas corpus.2 Although federal habeas corpus review was historically
designed to perform the fundamental function of correcting wrongful convictions of the innocent,
under AEDPA, federal habeas review no longer adequately achieves that goal.
Notably, the overhaul of federal habeas procedure under AEDPA occurred before the
Innocence Movement was in full swing. Thus, the debate leading up to the enactment of AEDPA
did not benefit from the exoneration data available today. Now that the number of exonerations

1
Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 837, 841
(2011/2012) (quoting Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 463 (2001)).
2

BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 185
(2011) (noting that not a single DNA exoneration in the study was successful in raising a post-conviction claim based on
new evidence of actual innocence).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss1/2

HARTUNG.FORMATTED.ROUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

HABEAS CORPUS FOR THE INNOCENT

4/14/2016 12:37 PM

3

has risen to over 1,7003—a figure widely recognized as the mere tip of the iceberg—the moment
to revisit federal review of criminal convictions is long overdue.4 This Article proposes a federal
post-conviction innocence track as a viable, systemic response to the wrongful conviction crisis.
As the Innocence Movement turns twenty-five—and as it continues to expose the depths of the
wrongful conviction crisis in the American criminal justice system—the time has come for more
widespread systemic reform.
The post-conviction innocence track proposal presented in this Article revives a
comparable recommendation made by prominent habeas scholars Joseph C. Hoffmann and
William J. Stuntz, over twenty-five years ago. In 1993, prior to the passage of AEDPA, Professors
Hoffmann and Stuntz proposed a separate procedural track for prisoners raising claims of actual
innocence via federal habeas corpus.5 This idea did not gain traction in the decades after it was
proposed; to the contrary, the passage of AEDPA just three years later had precisely the opposite
impact, imposing additional procedural barriers on prisoners raising post-conviction claims of
innocence.6 Yet the rationale behind the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal applies with even greater
force today, now that the Innocence Movement has exposed the depths of the wrongful conviction
crisis.
A federal post-conviction innocence track is attractive because it offers a universal
avenue of relief for all state and federal prisoners, regardless of the jurisdiction of the underlying
conviction. This approach offers a venue where the assessment of innocence claims could offer
meaningful protection for all prisoners. Further, at the post-conviction stage, participation in an
innocence track would not require a waiver of constitutional rights. Finally, this approach would
align with the purpose of federal habeas corpus review—to remedy wrongful convictions of the
innocent.7 Given the limited judicial resources available for reviewing and litigating federal
habeas corpus petitions, it is wise to devote the lion’s share to the most deserving applicants.
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of federal habeas corpus review since the
passage of AEDPA in 1996. Part II examines the impact of the Innocence Movement on the
operation of federal post-conviction review. Part III critiques previous proposals to establish a
3

See National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx
(last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (listing 1,702 known exonerations in the United States as of Nov. 17, 2015).
4
John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 297 (2006) (arguing that
“[g]iven the number of exonerations in recent years, the scope of the writ—if it is to retain its historical function as a
safeguard of freedom in our criminal justice system—should be expanded, not contracted . . . ”).
5

Joseph C. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 95 (1993)
(proposing a “reasonable probability of innocence” standard in federal habeas corpus procedure).
6
See, e.g., Lyn Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A
Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with
Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 87 (2005) (“[T]he AEDPA . . . created significant restrictions on a
federal prisoner’s ability to actually move a federal court for . . . relief.”); Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong With It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 919-20 (2001) (asserting
that AEDPA has made it “more difficult for claims of innocence to be heard by federal courts”); Amy Knight Burns,
Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 228 (2013) (“Habeas
is not an exercise in protecting states’ autonomy at all costs. Indeed, if that were the goal, there would be no habeas review
at all. Instead, courts must balance federalism interests with defendants’ constitutional rights.”).

Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that “nowhere is the remedial role of habeas so important
as in the case of a . . . [wrongfully convicted] innocent person”).
7
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pre-trial innocence track. Part IV discusses the historical support for a federal post-conviction
innocence track, including the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal from 1993. Finally, Part V
advocates for a federal post-conviction innocence track, and suggests a conceptual framework for
this proposal.
I.

EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW SINCE AEDPA

The purpose of the writ of federal habeas corpus, or “the Great Writ” has historically
been to provide a remedy for wrongful convictions. 8 Indeed, the “protection of innocent
defendants” is widely recognized as the primary concern in the context of federal habeas review
of criminal convictions.9 While AEDPA ostensibly sought to balance that historical purpose with
the countervailing interests of federalism, comity and finality, many conclude that Congress failed
to achieve this balance.10
In fact, AEDPA is a statute that likely never would have passed without the fortuitous
exploitation of the Oklahoma City bombings and the prosecution of Timothy McVeigh. 11 As one
legal scholar has noted, “AEDPA’s antiterrorism and habeas provisions were a legislative pairing
occasioned by a national tragedy . . . [that] few legislators dared oppose.”12
A.

The Passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”]

In spite of AEDPA’s name, the undisputed impact of the legislation was to overhaul
federal habeas corpus review for all prisoners—not merely those charged with terrorism or death
penalty offenses.13 AEDPA was enacted to vindicate the principles of “comity, finality and
federalism”, all of which militate against relief for the petitioner regardless of the nature of the
claim.14 The authors of AEDPA sought to address the rampant “abuse of the writ,” the notion that
prisoners were filing repeated specious petitions which operated to overwhelm the federal
courts.15
8
See, e.g., Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 69 (“The statutory writ of federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners can be categorized as one example of the general class of federal court remedies that have been created or
recognized for the purpose of redressing violations of federal constitutional rights.”).
9

Id. at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence).

10

See, e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 6, at 87 (arguing that AEDPA imposed undue restrictions on federal
habeas procedure); Williams, supra note 6, at 919-20 (asserting that AEDPA has made it “more difficult for claims of
innocence to be heard by federal courts”).
11

Blume, supra note 4, at 265-70 (discussing political climate during the debate and enactment of

AEDPA).
Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 447 (2007)
(discussing political climate at time of AEDPA’s passage).
12

13

Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act’s Restrictions on Habeas Corpus are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 55, 58-59 (2013) (noting
provisions that “struck. . . deeply at the heart of the spirit and history of habeas corpus. . .”).
14

See Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 444-45 (discussing the motivating principles behind the passage of

15

See generally Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal Habeas Corpus and

AEDPA).
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AEDPA passed in 1996, in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombings, after “decades of
failed legislative attempts to. . .limit federal review”16 of state convictions. The measure passed in
remarkably short order, with little legislative discussion or debate as to the post-conviction review
procedures.17 However, some members of Congress argued that habeas corpus reform measures
did not belong in an anti-terrorism bill.18 As Congress debated the merits of the new statutory
scheme, there was a robust discussion of the provisions relating to terrorism, wiretapping and
immigration.19 Yet very little comparable discussion or debate occurred regarding the overhauled
post-conviction review procedures.20 Further, in signing the bill, President Clinton did little more
than pay “lip service” to the provisions relating to federal review of state court convictions. 21
However, while the underlying purpose of AEDPA’s federal habeas review procedures
clearly was to promote efficiency and finality of criminal convictions, the proponents of the
legislation argued that federal habeas review would remain “alive and meaningful.”22 In fact,
nothing in the express language of AEDPA suggests a purpose at odds with the history and
purpose of the Great Writ, i.e., to redress injustices and provide a defense against violations of
personal freedom.23 Instead, AEDPA’s proponents sought to respond to prosecutors who
complained that federal courts “too often undid hard-won convictions or death sentences” via
federal habeas corpus review.24
At its core, the argument in support of AEDPA centered on the notion that federal review
of state court convictions amounts to undue interference, given that crime prevention, prosecution
and punishment fall squarely within the purview of state power. 25 On the other hand, AEDPA
the Piecemeal Problem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 55, 64-69 (2014) (providing a more complete
discussion of the history of AEDPA’s passage).
16
Justin Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 93
(2012); See also Larry Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 541, 545-46 (2006) (discussing history of AEDPA’s passage and commenting that “It was clear that some
‘antiterrorism’ bill was going to pass and that anything wedged in to that bill would pass with it.”).
17
Yackle, supra note 16, at 546 (noting that AEDPA was drafted by staff attorneys serving the Senate
Judiciary Committee without the benefit of discussions with minority counsel or others over policy or wording, and no
committee hearings or markup sessions, and concluding that the “bill shot through committee . . . and went to the floor
without an explanatory report”).
18

Ritter, supra note 13, at 58 n.27 (discussing legislative debate leading up to the passage of AEDPA).

19

Id. at 73-74 (discussing history and purpose of AEDPA).

20

Id. at 73-74, 82 (discussing history and purpose of AEDPA, and noting that the legislative history of
AEDPA does not suggest that Congress intended any “watering down” of the Great Writ’s historical function).
21
See Blume, supra note 4, at 259 (noting that while Clinton’s “presidential signing statement paid lip
service to meaningful federal court review of state court convictions,” AEDPA’s focus was clearly the anti-terrorism and
death penalty procedure reform measures).

Ritter, supra note 13, at 82 (arguing that “nothing in AEDPA or its legislative history suggests intent to
diminish the protective promise of the Great Writ”).
22

23

Id. at 73-74, 82.

24

Id. at 75.

25

Blume, supra note 4, at 263-64 (noting that habeas opponents point to crime punishment and control as a
“quintessential state function”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

HARTUNG.FORMATTED.ROUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

4/14/2016 12:37 PM

[Vol. 19.1

opponents argued that federal habeas review of state convictions is necessary to preserve the
sanctity and uniformity of federal law. 26 Ultimately, AEDPA’s supporters won the day and
AEDPA became law.
B. Criticisms of AEDPA

Since its passage in 1996, AEDPA has been widely critiqued both in legal scholarship
and in the media generally.27 For example, AEDPA has been criticized as a “poorly drafted” piece
of legislation that was hastily enacted with little insight into Congress’ true intent.28 This poor
drafting has led to ambiguity resulting in circuit splits on various issues. 29 Additionally, courts
have been left to interpret AEDPA’s often confusing and self-contradictory provisions, with little
guidance. In short, legal scholars have argued that AEDPA has operated to catapult the federal
habeas system into a state of chaos. 30
Further, the substantive impact of AEDPA on federal habeas review of state convictions
cannot be overstated. Legal scholars have frequently commented on AEDPA’s role in gutting
federal habeas review, and indeed, the substantive and procedural barriers imposed by AEDPA
have been characterized as “insurmountable.”31 Some of AEDPA’s provisions have been targets
for particularized critique as well, including the strict one-year filing limitation.32
Widespread critique of AEDPA’s other provisions has been forthcoming as well,
Id. (“Proponents of broad habeas review extolled (and extol) the need for every inmate that so desires to
have a federal forum to entertain the merits of her federal constitutional challenges to the underlying conviction and
sentence.”).
26

See Marceau, supra note 16, at 94 (noting that AEDPA’s passage was greeted by the legal academy with
“vast fear and loathing”); see also Nat Hentoff, Clinton Screws the Bill of Rights: The Worst Civil Liberties President
Since Nixon, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 5, 1996, at 12 (arguing that AEDPA contains “the most draconian restrictions on
habeas corpus since Lincoln suspended the Great Writ. . . during the Civil War.”).
27

See, e.g., Blume, supra note 4, at 261 (arguing that “the speed with which Congress enacted AEDPA left
the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, with little guidance regarding Congress’ intent”); Burns, supra note 6, at
206-07 (noting that “AEDPA is a complex, poorly drafted statute that is impossible to interpret logically and consistently”
and that “its text. . . is irresolvably ambiguous”); Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 447 (commenting that “AEDPA imposed or
fortified several obstacles to habeas relief, although hastily ratified and poorly cohered.”); Yackle, supra note 16, at 548
(“The manner in which AEDPA was cobbled together suggests that no one
28

thought . . . [the impact of the statute’s provisions] through at a conceptual level.”).
29
Blume, supra note 4, at 290 (discussing role of the Supreme Court in resolving circuit splits stemming
from unclear drafting in various AEDPA provisions).
30
Yackle, supra note 16, at 542 (arguing that the passage of AEDPA has left the state of federal habeas
review procedures “in chaos”).

See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 16, at 166 (commenting that “AEDPA poses procedural and substantive
barriers that are often insurmountable”).
31

See, e.g., Blume, supra note 4, at 289 (“[AEDPA’s] new statute of limitations has deprived thousands of
potential habeas petitioners of any federal review of their convictions, and in some cases, their death sentences.”); see also
Limin Zheng, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas
Corpus Petitions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2101, 2103-07 (2002) (discussing AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision as a radical
departure from historical federal habeas jurisprudence).
32
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particularly for the impact on actually innocent prisoners seeking review of their convictions. 33
For example, the wrongful conviction scholarship has criticized AEDPA’s bars on substantive
relief, including restrictions on second and successive petitions. 34 Additionally, several of
AEDPA’s provisions have effectively abolished federal de novo review of state criminal
convictions, in favor of a high degree of deference to state court decisions.35 At least one legal
scholar has argued, “AEDPA has stripped substantive federal habeas review to the bone.”36
Further, the substantive standards a prisoner is required to meet under AEDPA have been
characterized as “very nearly impossible to satisfy.”37 Each of these criticisms is discussed in
more detail below.
1. Statute of Limitations

One of the primary criticisms of AEDPA focuses on its strict one-year limitations period.
AEDPA’s passage demonstrated a marked departure from well-established common law, by
imposing for the first time a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas petitions. 38
Section 2244(d)(1) provides that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”39 This
section of the statute further specifies that the limitations period begins to run on the date of final
judgment or relevant change in the law, whichever is later, and tolls with the interim filing of a
state habeas petition.40 While the statute does not expressly allow an exception for actual
innocence, the Supreme Court has recognized that a cognizable claim of factual innocence could
overcome procedural bars—at least in theory.41
Throughout this Article, the terms “factually innocent” and “actually innocent” are used interchangeably
to refer to cases in which the charged party either did not commit the crimes in question, or no crime was committed at all.
This category does not include the scenario in which a conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution, i.e., based
on illegally obtained evidence or ineffective assistance of counsel. Nor does it include convictions in which a legal defense
could be raised, such as self-defense or failure to form the requisite intent.
33

34

See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 448-53 (discussing primary restrictions imposed on federal habeas
petitioners under AEDPA).
35
Marceau, supra note 16, at 89-90 (arguing that in the wake of AEDPA, “the era of exhaustive de novo
federal habeas review has passed”).
36

Id. at 126 (discussing impact of AEDPA on federal habeas review).

37

Yackle, supra note 16, at 570.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Zheng, supra note 32, at 2105-07 (discussing AEDPA’s
statute of limitations provision as a radical departure from historical federal habeas jurisprudence).
38

39

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

40

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).

41

See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (recognizing actual innocence as a gateway through which
a petitioner may pass a procedural bar); cf. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006) (suggesting actual innocence as a
catalyst to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations in limited circumstances); McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct.
1924, 1928 (2013) (holding that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass
whether the impediment is a procedural bar. . . or. . . expiration of the statute of limitations” and reasoning that
unjustifiable delay in filing is not an absolute barrier to relief, but is instead a factor in determining whether innocence has
been reliably shown).
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Legal scholars have been particularly critical of the statute of limitations provision based
on its lack of support by any clear policy justification. 42 For example, although AEDPA was
ostensibly passed in order to curb abuses in the filing of federal habeas petitions, there is no
support for the notion that prisoners intentionally delayed their filings prior to the passage of
AEDPA.43 Nor is there a persuasive argument that convicted prisoners or their counsel would
have any motivation to do so. To the contrary, it would be irrational for capital litigants or their
counsel to intentionally withhold a petition until execution is imminent. 44 Similarly, non-capital
petitioners would gain nothing from intentional delay, which could operate to extend the
prisoner’s sentence.45
Additionally, the statute of limitations provision has been criticized as especially
burdensome to pro se litigants, who must undertake the considerable task of compiling a habeas
petition while incarcerated and without the benefit of legal counsel. 46 Indeed, it is difficult to
comprehend the congressional purpose behind this provision, given that prisoners are often
uneducated and ill equipped to advance a complex legal argument. 47 Prisoners often have limited
access to law libraries and frequently are transferred from one facility to another without notice. 48
This can result in significant delay in notification of state court decisions.49 Thus, a prisoner may
not learn of the denial of his state habeas petition until months after the fact. 50 This provision
arguably has a virtually preclusive effect on pro se litigants seeking to raise claims of innocence
via federal habeas corpus.

Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute
of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 360 (2001) (“Reading the legislative history surrounding
AEDPA’s passage, one gets the sense that the idea of an innocent prisoner failing to file a federal habeas corpus petition
within the limitations period was simply unthinkable.”); Zheng, supra note 32, at 2131 (noting that AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitations “neither curbs abuse nor addresses the problem of delay”).
42

43

Zheng, supra note 32, at 2131 (noting the absence of indication that federal habeas petitioners
intentionally delay their claims and arguing that there is no motivation to do so).
44

Id. (asserting that death row inmates have no motivation to delay filing of federal habeas petitions).

Id. (noting that a non-capital habeas litigant “has nothing to gain but everything to lose by delaying the
filing of his federal claim: If his claim is denied, he serves the same length of time in prison whether the filing was delayed
or not . . . if he succeeds in establishing his constitutional claim, the delay in filing would have brought him no benefit but
a longer period of unnecessary imprisonment.”).
45

46

Id. at 2131-32 (discussing the difficulty facing pro se litigants seeking to compile a federal habeas
petition while incarcerated).
47
See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 MD. L.
REV. 1393, 1409 (1999) (arguing that the right to counsel should extend to some post-conviction proceedings); see also
Hartung, supra note 15, at 88-89 (arguing that the increasingly complex nature of post-AEDPA federal habeas litigation
supports a greater need for the right to counsel).
48
See Zheng, supra note 32, at 2130 (explaining that “inmates are often transferred from one prison to
another and may not be able to learn about a state court’s final denial [of a habeas petition] until much later”).
49

Id.

50

Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss1/2

HARTUNG.FORMATTED.ROUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/14/2016 12:37 PM

HABEAS CORPUS FOR THE INNOCENT

9

2. Undue Deference to State Court Decisions

An additional criticism of AEDPA is that it has operated to obliterate federal de novo
review of state convictions.51 Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)52 provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
This provision has been characterized as “the centerpiece of AEDPA” and is notable for
its lack of support in either the common law or the legal scholarship preceding the passage of
AEDPA.53
Professor Judith Ritter argues that since the passage of AEDPA, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Williams v. Taylor54 seems to do away with de novo review, under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1).55 Further, the Supreme Court has recently interpreted this provision of AEDPA to
mean that a state court conclusion is “contrary to clearly established federal law” under §
2254(d)(1) only if “no fair-minded jurist could agree” with this interpretation.56 Since Williams
was decided, some federal district courts have lamented the lack of clear guidance as to what
renders a state court determination “unreasonable.” Indeed, the Circuit Courts of Appeal remain
split as to how this term should be applied.57 At one extreme, the Second Circuit has interpreted
“unreasonable” to mean “so off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.”58 At the other, the
Seventh Circuit has interpreted it to mean “well outside the boundaries of permissible differences
of opinion.”59 And the Ninth Circuit has offered still another interpretation, applying a “clear
51

Ritter, supra note 13, at 59 (noting that the most critical impact of AEDPA was the movement away from

de novo review).
52

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).

Blume, supra note 4, at 272-73 (noting that § 2254(d)(1) has “no habeas pedigree; for example, it was not
taken from any Supreme Court decision, like other AEDPA provisions, nor was it part of any previous habeas reform
proposal offered by Congress or a habeas scholar.”).
53

54

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).

55

Ritter, supra note 13, at 56-57 (discussing Williams v. Taylor opinion).

Id. at 57 (arguing that the “no fair-minded jurist” standard is unreasonable and results in injustice in the
post-conviction context).
56

57

Id. at 64-65 (discussing split in circuits regarding interpretation of “unreasonable” in § 2254(d)(1)).

58

Id. at 64.
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error” standard.60
Under any of these interpretations, the “unreasonable” standard is a difficult one. Indeed,
state court prisoners seeking redress from federal courts face what Professor Justin Marceau calls
“one of the most uncharitable standards of review known to law.”61 The impact of this provision
has been criticized as effectively relegating the role of federal constitutional arbiter to the state,
rather than the federal courts.62
3. Inherently Contradictory Provisions

Additionally, the underlying policy interests that ostensibly motivated Congress in
enacting AEDPA have been criticized as self-contradictory in at least two respects. 63 First, there
arguably is an inherent conflict between the interests of comity and finality when interpreting the
provisions of AEDPA. While the exhaustion doctrine promotes comity, i.e., the notion that state
court judgments should be respected, the statute of limitations provision promotes finality, i.e., the
preservation of the court’s original judgment at all costs. Second, there arguably is an inherent
conflict between the underlying principles of the exhaustion doctrine and the statute of limitations
provisions, both codified in AEDPA.64 The exhaustion doctrine is based on the premise that
federal habeas petitions should move more slowly, to ensure that all claims are raised in the state
courts before they can be reviewed in the federal courts. 65 By contrast, the statute of limitations
provisions militate toward the speedy and efficient filing of federal habeas petitions. 66 These two
provisions are not easily reconciled, and prisoners seeking federal habeas relief must navigate
these inherently contradictory demands.67

59

Id. at 65.

60

Id. at 65.

Id. at 81 (discussing split in circuits regarding interpretation of “unreasonable” in § 2254(d)(1)); see also
Hartung, supra note 15, at 78 (arguing that “state courts have become final arbiters of federal constitutional law, as
opposed to federal courts, which are presumably in a better position to play this role”).
61

62
Christopher M. Johnson, Post-Trial Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions: A Comparative Study of
the United States and Finland, 64 ME. L REV. 425, 429 (2012) (“The current deferential standard of review reflects the
concern that federal courts, if entrusted with the power of de novo review of federal constitutional claims, will too
frequently and improperly overturn state convictions on federal law grounds.”).
63
Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 457-58 (discussing competing interests of comity and finality in the context
of federal habeas review under AEDPA); Yackle, supra note 16, at 551 (discussing internal conflict present among several
of AEDPA’s provisions).
64

Yackle, supra note 16, at 551 (discussing internal conflict present among several of AEDPA’s

provisions).
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 29 (1997) (noting that AEDPA’s “filing deadline
encourages prisoners to file early, while the exhaustion doctrine demands that they postpone federal habeas petitions until
state court opportunities for litigation have been tried”); see also Hartung, supra note 15, at 82 (discussing the inherent
tension created by conflicting goals of exhaustion doctrine and statute of limitations).
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4. Limits on Second or Successive Petitions

The opportunity to file second or successive petitions has essentially been foreclosed by
AEDPA.68 First, AEDPA substantially altered how federal courts address second and successive
habeas petitions. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) operates to universally prohibit successive
claims, i.e., those raised in previous petitions. 69 A related provision, § 2244(b)(2), bars abusive
claims, i.e., those not previously raised in previous petitions, with exceptions where (1) the claim
relies on a new constitutional rule, or (2) the claim relies on newly discovered evidence not
discoverable with due diligence.70 However, given that the Supreme Court has yet to recognize
the wrongful conviction of an actually innocent defendant as a constitutional violation, a
freestanding claim of innocence is apparently insufficient under 2244(b)(2). 71
Additionally, the procedural framework that AEDPA erected creates other barriers to
prisoners seeking federal post-conviction review of their cases. Section 2244(b)(3) requires that
any successive petition must first be presented to a panel of appellate court judges in order to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case under the provisions of § 2244(b). 72

Yackle, supra note 16, at 571 (commenting that “AEDPA is so skeptical of second or successive
petitions that it requires prisoners to obtain circuit court permission to file them at the district level”).
68

69
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”).
70

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides:

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was
not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless (A) the applicant shows that the claim
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could
not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
§ 2244(b)(2). See also Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 91 (2011) (discussing exceptions to
AEDPA’s general bar on abusive petitions).
71

Joshua Lott, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In Re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 443, 453 (2011) (noting that in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “a substantive
claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered post-trial evidence is not cognizable; federal habeas relief can only
be granted when an independent constitutional violation occurred at the state criminal proceeding.”).
72

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) provides in full:

(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court,
the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district
court to consider the application. (B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge
panel of the court of appeals. (C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or
successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that
the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (D) The court of appeals shall grant or
deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the
filing of the motion. (E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second
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This gatekeeping provision imposes an extremely onerous burden on the petitioner. It has been
criticized as effectively allowing dismissal of petitions raising actual innocence claims that were
not available at the time of the original petition.73
These provisions, limiting—if not outright foreclosing—the opportunity to file second or
successive federal habeas petitions under AEDPA, have a particularly acute impact on prisoners
raising claims of actual innocence. Typically evidence supporting factual innocence tends to arise
in an ad hoc fashion, while the petitioner is incarcerated and acting pro se. 74 Therefore, successive
petitions are not uncommon.75 Further, prisoners are motivated to file their petitions expeditiously
in order to comply with the strict one-year limitations period.76 The combination of these two
factors—ad hoc and inconsistent access to information, along with the need to comply with a
strict filing period—results in the de facto filing of multiple petitions when seeking to establish
innocence.77
5. High Standard of Proof to Establish Innocence

Finally, AEDPA has substantially raised the standard of proof imposed on prisoners
seeking habeas relief based on actual innocence. Before AEDPA was enacted, the Supreme Court
held in Schlup v. Delo that a claim of actual innocence should be considered under the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default doctrine in federal habeas
litigation.78 Notably, Schlup required that a petitioner establish actual innocence by a mere
preponderance of the evidence.79
AEDPA has significantly altered the Schlup standard by imposing a higher standard on

or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for
rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
§ 2244(b)(3).
73
See, e.g., Kyle Reynolds, “Second or Successive” Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims after
Panetti v. Quarterman, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2007) (noting that “AEDPA’s ‘gatekeeping’ provisions . . . have
the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims”); Williams, supra note 6, at 942 (commenting that
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) “creates barriers that even an innocent individual is not likely to overcome”).
74
Hartung, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing that, given the realities of post-conviction litigation, and claims of
innocence in particular, “it is no surprise that when a pro se prisoner seeks federal habeas corpus review, the process is
likely to occur via multiple successive petitions, each raising a new ground for relief,” since “new information may present
itself once the petition has been filed”).
75

Id.

76

Id. (noting a that prisoner typically has “limited access to information and faces a one-year limitations

77

Id.

period”).

78
513 U.S. at 326-27; see also Lott, supra note 71, at 454-55 (discussing the Schlup holding and its impact
on actual innocence claims in federal habeas petitions).

Lott, supra note 71, at 455 (“The Schlup test balances the innocence evidence against the reliability of the
state’s verdict to determine ‘whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole
would lack reasonable doubt.’” (citation omitted)).
79
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federal habeas petitioners claiming innocence. 80 While the Schlup Court had required only a
showing that new evidence was “more likely than not” to raise reasonable doubt regarding the
petitioner’s guilt, under AEDPA, a petitioner seeking relief must establish actual innocence by
“clear and convincing evidence.”81 This standard has resulted in virtual foreclosure of relief for
petitioners raising claims of innocence. 82
C. Judicial Treatment of AEDPA

Although AEDPA’s impact has been indisputably profound, in the decades preceding its
passage, the Rehnquist Court had already definitively limited federal habeas review of state
criminal convictions.83 In the absence of legislative reform, the prevailing judicial interpretation
of federal habeas review operated to significantly curtail federal review of state convictions. 84
Since AEDPA’s passage, legal scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its provisions as unduly restrictive to petitioners. 85 While initially, the Supreme
Court’s treatment of AEDPA was widely regarded as cautious, in recent years many legal
scholars have reached the opposite conclusion.86 For example, Professor Ritter has argued that,
following an initial grace period on the heels of AEDPA’s passage, recent Supreme Court
decisions have created the possibility of “habeas corpus relief . . . becom[ing] virtually
unattainable.”87 Under either view, the standard required to convince a federal court to undermine
a state court determination is formidable.
There is little room for disagreement that the Supreme Court has only rarely granted
federal habeas relief in recent years. However, there has been some debate in the legal academy as
Id. at 456 (commenting that AEDPA’s provisions were “[i]n direct contrast to Schlup’s probab[ility]
standard” and instead required proof of innocence by “clear and convincing evidence”).
80

81

Id.

82

See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 32, at 2139-40 (arguing that courts should apply the old Schlup probability
standard rather than AEDPA’s “clear and convincing” standard when assessing claims of actual innocence); see also
Krystal Moore, Is Saving an Innocent Man a “Fool’s Errand”? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act on an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, 36 DAYTON L. REV. 197, 213 (“The unreasonable standard
required by section 2254(d)(1) is a rigid standard that bars relief for potentially innocent men.”).
Ritter, supra note 13, at 58 (discussing history of Supreme Court’s treatment of federal habeas review in
the years leading up to AEDPA, and noting that AEDPA operated to “dramatically curtail[] the availability of federal
habeas relief”).
83

84

Id.

See, e.g., Burns, supra note 6, at 207 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to engage in
counterfactual reasoning—i.e., to meaningfully address how the state court would have ruled with the benefit of newly
discovered information—has resulted in injustice for federal habeas petitioners).
85

86

See generally Blume, supra note 4 (discussing results of study of Supreme Court treatment of pre- and
post-AEDPA habeas petitions and concluding that AEDPA’s “hype” is worse than its “bite”); see also Marceau, supra
note 16, at 96 (contradicting Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA’s “hype” is worse that its “bite” and arguing that
“AEDPA’s bite, though perhaps slow to manifest symptoms, has gradually and systemically infected and undermined the
federal habeas infrastructure”).
Ritter, supra note 13, at 56 (discussing impact of Supreme Court’s interpretation of AEDPA on federal
habeas review procedures and noting the barriers imposed to obtaining relief).
87
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to whether, and to what degree, the Supreme Court’s treatment of federal habeas petitions has
been substantially altered since the passage of AEDPA in 1996.88 This debate has been fueled by
the recent studies of two prominent habeas scholars, Professors John Blume and Justin Marceau.
1. Blume Study

Professor John Blume published the results of an empirical study comparing pre- and
post-AEDPA Supreme Court decisions in his 2006 article, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite.”89
In this study, Professor Blume reviewed all federal habeas cases decided by the Supreme Court
during a sixteen-year period from 1990-2006, both before and after AEDPA was enacted. 90 This
study ultimately concluded that the success rate of petitioners seeking federal habeas relief before
the Supreme Court essentially remained the same before and after the passage of AEDPA.91
Specifically, Blume’s study revealed that of the 63 pre-AEDPA cases decided by the Supreme
Court, the petitioner was successful 33% of the time. 92 Comparably, of the 41 cases decided after
AEDPA’s passage in 1996, 34% were successful.93
Professor Blume opines that the reason the Supreme Court was not more definitively
impacted by the passage of AEDPA is that the Court had already started to apply federal habeas
review more narrowly during the decades before Congress passed legislation on this front. 94 The
results of Blume’s study are unaltered when federal circuit court results are reviewed, as well. 95
Furthermore, Blume’s study reports that the overall success rate in all federal habeas non-capital
cases—both before and after the passage of AEDPA—is decidedly low, at less than 1%, 96 and the
overall success rate in capital cases is just 8%.97
Finally, Blume’s study shows that federal habeas cases are increasingly decided on
procedural grounds and more petitioners are precluded from filing.98 Specifically, in 1997, 52% of
88

Supra note 86.

89

Supra note 86.

90

Blume, supra note 4, at 276-77 (discussing methodology and results of survey of Supreme Court
treatment of federal habeas cases before and after AEDPA).
91
Id. at 277 (concluding that “a habeas petitioner’s overall success rate did not significantly change after
AEDPA came into effect”).
92

Id.

93

Id.

94
Id. at 280 (noting that when “Congress failed to act in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, a majority of the
Supreme Court set about to ‘reform’ habeas corpus through the creation and refinement of various common law habeas
doctrines such as procedural default, abuse of the writ, and Teague nonretroactivity”).
95
Id. at 283 (noting that “the available data from the federal courts of appeals do not reveal that AEDPA
has had a tremendous impact on the ability of a habeas petitioner to ultimately secure a writ of habeas corpus”).
96
Id. at 284-85 (noting that “[l]ess than 1% of state prisoners who file federal habeas petitions ultimately
prevail” and that “[b]oth before and after AEDPA, it is the rare state prisoner who obtains the great writ”).

Id. at 285 (noting that “[f]rom 1997 to 2004, only 8% of death-sentenced inmates were successful” in
petitioning for habeas relief).
97

Id. at 286 (noting that “the total percentage of habeas corpus cases in the federal courts of appeals that are
disposed of on procedural grounds, as opposed to on the merits, has risen since 1997”).
98
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petitioners were denied permission to appeal from federal courts. 99 By 2004, eight years after
AEDPA’s passage, that figure had risen to 61%.100
2. Marceau Study

In rebuttal to Professor Blume’s study, Professor Justin Marceau conducted a more
expansive review of federal habeas jurisprudence six years later. This study ultimately supports a
contrary conclusion that the passage of AEDPA has indeed significantly impacted the Supreme
Court’s treatment of federal habeas review. 101 In his 2012 article, Challenging the Habeas
Process Rather Than the Result, Professor Marceau looks at the shift in law and data regarding
federal habeas corpus relief.102 Marceau argues that the Supreme Court has entered the “third
phase” of federal habeas corpus review. 103 Now that the initial criticism of AEDPA has subsided,
the Supreme Court has begun to interpret AEDPA more harshly, frequently overturning federal
courts that grant habeas relief against state court convictions.104
Marceau’s study undermines Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA’s “hype is worse than its
bite”—or at least suggests that it is no longer true. 105 Marceau sought to update Blume’s study by
expanding the data pool to include a review of cases from 1985-2011.106 Marceau’s study
revealed that the relief rate in federal habeas petitions filed post-AEDPA dropped by 10
percentage points from the pre-AEDPA relief rates.
Specifically, while the relief rate in pre-AEDPA cases filed between 1985 and 1995 was
37%, the post-AEDPA relief rate in cases filed from 1996-2011 dropped to 27%.107 However,
Marceau notes that the disparity between pre- and post-AEDPA relief rates is even more
pronounced when an initial grace period is taken into account. Marceau argues that the
“suddenness with which Congress enacted AEDPA” may have caught the Court off guard. 108
99
100

Id.
Id.

Marceau, supra note 16, at 96-97 (contradicting Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA’s “hype is worse than
its bite” and arguing that “AEDPA’s bite, though perhaps show to manifest symptoms, has gradually and systemically
infected and undermined the federal habeas infrastructure”).
101

102

Id. at 98-99 (discussing empirical evidence in support of the conclusion that the Supreme Court has
more narrowly granted federal habeas review under AEDPA).
Id. at 97 (arguing that “the Court has entered a third phase in which the application of AEDPA has
evolved so as to become increasingly harsh and the reversal of federal courts who disturb state court convictions
increasingly brazen”).
103

104

Id.

Id. at 98 (“By updating Blume’s data and expanding the range of years studied, one is left with the
impression that, as an empirical matter, Blume’s conclusion no longer holds true.”).
105

Id. at 98-99 (noting that study expands Blume’s data “so that it now runs from 1985 through 2011 (as
compared to 1990 through 2006)”).
106

107

Id. at 101-02 (discussing methodology and results of study of Supreme Court treatment of pre- and post-

AEDPA cases).
Id. at 104 (arguing that the impact of AEDPA’s restrictions on federal habeas jurisprudence were slowed
by an initial “grace period”).
108
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Thus, when an initial grace period is discounted from the analysis and the data from 2010-2011 is
reviewed exclusively, the federal habeas review rate drops even more dramatically to 14%.109
These findings suggest that AEDPA has had a more extreme impact on the Supreme Court’s
approach to federal habeas review than what was initially believed.
D. The Debate Regarding the Role of Federal Habeas Review in Modern Jurisprudence

In recent years, the age-old debate regarding the appropriate role of federal habeas
review of state criminal judgments has resurfaced, with legal scholars disagreeing about the
degree to which this final layer of review is necessary. 110 On the one hand, some legal scholars
have argued that federal habeas review in non-death penalty cases is superfluous. 111 By contrast,
others have argued that the dearth of successful federal habeas petitions supports the argument
that federal review is even more critical. These scholars argue that this minute success-rate in
modern, post-AEDPA jurisprudence illustrates a failure of the federal courts to perform the postconviction review necessary to protect the uniformity of federal law. 112
In his recent article, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, Professor
Marceau notes that “federal habeas law has reached a critical crossroads” in part as a result of
“doctrinal shifts and empirical data” showing that federal habeas petitions are virtually never
successful.113 Indeed, some legal scholars have advocated for an end to federal habeas review of
criminal convictions, arguing that the need for such measures has passed, and characterizing
federal habeas corpus review as “futile,” “worthless” and “illusory.”114
1. Argument for Limiting Federal Habeas Review of State Convictions

Specifically, Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann—along with other
proponents of this approach—argue that federal habeas review arose in a political and cultural
framework of 1960’s America that no longer exists today.115 During that period, the courts’
interpretation of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was expanded in order to accommodate for the lack
Id. at 106 (“In the past five years, the procedures and standards governing federal habeas review have
substantially evolved so as to reduce the power of federal courts to reverse unconstitutional state convictions.”).
109

110

See generally Marceau, supra note 16, at 86 (discussing recent scholarly trends regarding the role of
federal habeas review of state criminal convictions).
111
See generally NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT, 146-49 (2011) (arguing that federal habeas review is an impractical
and unnecessary remedy in non-death penalty cases).

Marceau, supra note 16, at 86 (arguing that “the paucity of success by habeas petitioners does not
naturally or necessarily justify the abandonment of federal oversight” and asserting that instead, “legal scholars and courts
should recognize the critical role federal courts play in ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair”).
112

113

Id. at 92 (discussing modern debate over role of federal habeas review of state criminal convictions).

114

Id. at 131 (discussing role of federal habeas review in contemporary jurisprudence).

115

Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/opinion/17hoffmann.html?_r=0 (arguing that “the federal courts remain in a 1960’sstyle habeas rut [and] continue to receive tens of thousands of habeas petitions from convicted state prisoners,” and
asserting that federal habeas review of state court convictions is no longer necessary).
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of adequate state court protections.116 Thus, as the argument goes, federal review has
appropriately retreated in the modern era, with the understanding that states have been more
effective at establishing post-conviction review procedures.117
Professors King and Hoffman go on to argue that a “crisis of federalism” no longer exists
as it did in the 1960’s.118 They further cite to the miniscule rate of federal habeas corpus relief as
evidence that such federal review is now unnecessary, 119 and argue that federal habeas review
wastes precious judicial resources that could better be deployed for programs such as state
funding of public defense counsel. 120 Central to the King and Hoffman argument is the fact that
very few federal habeas petitions are successful, particularly those filed in non-capital cases.121
Indeed, less than 1% of federal habeas petitions are granted in non-capital cases, and over 40% of
those claims are dismissed on procedural grounds, without any review of the petitioner’s claims
on the merits.122 However, even advocates for the elimination or severe curtailing of federal
habeas review carve out an exception where a viable claim of actual innocence is raised.123
2. Argument for Expanding Federal Habeas Review of State Convictions

On the other hand, Professor Marceau and other legal scholars have argued that federal
review is still necessary to ensure the adequacy of state process.124 Specifically, Professor
Marceau vigorously disagrees with the proposal to abolish federal habeas review, and argues that
the “Constitution is already severely under-enforced through post-AEDPA habeas corpus
litigation.”125 Further, Marceau argues that the minimal—arguably nonexistent—substantive
review that exists under AEDPA mandates that process-based review be “more frequent and
capacious.”126
116

Marceau, supra note 16, at 90 (discussing the original rationale for expanding the Writ in the 1960’s).

117

Id. at 90-91 (arguing that federal oversight of state court convictions is necessary in modern
jurisprudence “to ensure the adequacy of the state processes”).
118
119

Id. at 128.
Id. (discussing the argument in favor of abolishing federal habeas corpus review of state criminal

convictions).
120

Id.

121

Id. at 138 (discussing the low success rate of federal habeas petitions).

122

Id. (discussing the realities of the AEDPA regime and noting the low success rate of non-capital federal

habeas petitions).
123

Id. at 128-29 (noting that King & Hoffman argue for the existence of non-capital federal habeas corpus
where there is clear and convincing proof of actual innocence).
124
Id. at 90-91 (arguing that federal review of state convictions is still necessary in the twenty-first
century); see also Yackle, supra note 16, at 559 (identifying enduring need for federal review of state court convictions,
and arguing that federal habeas system has completely broken down, requiring the creation of a new model “from
scratch”).
125
See Marceau, supra note 16, at 129 (arguing in favor of maintaining federal habeas review of state
criminal convictions).
126

Id. at 145 (advocating for a more expansive interpretation of AEDPA’s procedural protections).
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3. The Primacy of Innocence in the Federal Habeas Debate

Even the proponents of abandoning—or radically restricting—federal habeas review
under AEDPA, advocate for maintaining this extra layer of review in non-capital cases where
credible claims of actual innocence are raised. 127 Indeed the primacy of innocence has remained at
the heart of the debate regarding federal habeas review. 128 Given the original purpose of the Great
Writ to provide a remedy for wrongful convictions of the innocent, both advocates and opponents
of restricting federal habeas review agree that maintaining an effective mechanism for evaluating
claims of factual innocence and remedying wrongful convictions, once they are identified, is
critical.129
Further, there is historic support for the idea that factually innocent prisoners seeking
federal habeas relief should be treated differently than other petitioners. For example, in Stone v.
Powell,130 the United States Supreme Court determined that federal habeas relief is an
inappropriate remedy for a prisoner raising Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule issues. 131 The
Court impliedly reasoned in Stone that, given the limited resources available to the federal courts,
federal habeas review should be reserved for cases where factual innocence is raised, or at the
very least the evidence is challenged as “inherently unreliable.”132
II.

THE IMPACT OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT: HOW THE EXONERATION DATA SHIFTS
THE BALANCE IN THE FEDERAL HABEAS POLICY DEBATE

Over the last two decades since AEDPA was enacted, the Innocence Movement has been
instrumental in bringing about significant change in the criminal justice system. The knowledge
that wrongful convictions of the innocent have occurred and continue to occur, at rates higher
127
Id. at 128-29 (arguing for limited application of federal habeas corpus review in non-capital cases,
restricted to cases in which petitioner can raise “clear and convincing proof of factual innocence”); see also Hoffmann &
Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence);
Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack in Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142-43 (197071) (arguing that “with few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner
supplements his constitutional pleas with a colorable claim of innocence”).
128
Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in federal
habeas corpus jurisprudence); see also Friendly, supra note 127, at 144 (proposing that federal habeas review apply
exclusively to petitioners raising claims of factual innocence).
129

Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that the remedial role of habeas is most important in
cases of innocent persons).
130

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).

131

Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 347 (2006) (noting that Stone v.
Powell represented the palpable moment when “the tide of mistrust of state courts had turned” in the Supreme Court’s
view of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence).
132
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, at 224
(1969) (“The primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations are different
in kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not ‘impugn the
integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement
officers.’”).
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than ever previously imagined, has led to a much-needed reexamination of our criminal justice
system.133 Specifically, the data from the first 300 DNA exonerations has suggested the
recurrence of certain factors—such as eyewitness misidentification, coerced confession,
prosecutorial misconduct and flawed forensic evidence—play a prominent role in wrongful
convictions of the innocent.134
The identification of these wrongful conviction factors has led to related reforms in the
criminal justice system.135 However, most of these reforms have occurred at the pretrial level, and
have focused on individual changes in police and prosecutorial procedures, rather than on
systemic reform.136 Indeed, for all its successes, the Innocence Movement has been criticized for
its failure to focus on larger-scale systemic change.137
For example, Professor Tim Bakken has argued that the primary factors present in
wrongful convictions have been well-known since Edwin Borchard published Convicting the
Innocent,138 over 75 years ago in 1932.139 Professor Bakken further argues that the reforms
brought to bear at the hands of the Innocence Movement in the modern era essentially mirror the
suggestions for reform proffered nearly a century ago, in 1932. 140
See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 6 (“DNA exonerations have changed the face of the criminal justice in
the United States by revealing that wrongful convictions do occur and, in the process, altering how judges, lawyers,
legislators, the public, and scholars perceive the system’s accuracy. This sea change came about because of the hard work
of visionary lawyers, journalists, and students. . . [from the Innocence Project].”).
133

See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 130 (2008) (“Analysis of data
regarding known innocent convicts, from their trials through their appeals and DNA exoneration, does not provide reasons
to be optimistic that our system effectively prevents serious factual miscarriages at trial, detects them during appeals or
post-conviction proceedings, or remedies them through DNA testing.”).
134

See generally Robert Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”: Evaluating State Safeguards
Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALA. L. REV. 1301 (2011) (discussing the legislative and policy reforms in the criminal
justice system in the fifty states in the wake of the Innocence Movement); see also Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River
Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV.
655, 656 (2005) (citing the impact of DNA evidence in exposing wrongful convictions and leading to legal reforms in the
criminal justice system).
135

136
Bakken, supra note 1, at 838-39 (arguing that Innocence Movement reforms have fallen into three
categories: “us[ing] social science research to make police interrogations and identification procedures better, hold[ing]
police officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to higher standards, and provid[ing] more resources to
defendants.”).
137
Id. at 866 (arguing that the modern Innocence Movement recommendations for reform are “similar to
those made in 1932”).
138

EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE (1932).
Bakken, supra note 1, at 840-41 (“In 1932, Professor Edwin Borchard published CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT, a book in which he set out 65 cases of wrongful conviction and offered proposals for reform. The causes he
identified for the wrongful convictions—mistaken identifications, inadequate lawyering, police or prosecutorial
misconduct, false or coerced confessions, and perjury—are strikingly similar to those offered today by advocates for the
wrongfully convicted. He also advocated the same kinds of relief as today’s advocates. Yet we find ourselves, seventy
years late [in 2011], addressing the same problems and the same causes.”) (quoting Margaret Raymond, The Problem with
Innocence, 49 CLEV ST. L. REV. 449, 463 (2001)).
139

140

Id. at 866 (arguing that the modern Innocence Movement recommendations for reform are “similar to
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Professor Bakken’s argument about the ongoing need for systemic reform in the criminal
justice system applies with equal force in the federal post-conviction realm. While Congress
passed AEDPA with an eye toward broad reform of federal habeas procedure, it did so without
the benefit of the extensive exoneration data available today. Ostensibly, Congress sought to
balance the interests of comity, federalism and finality against the countervailing interest in
ensuring justice and fairness in criminal convictions.141 Today, given the newfound knowledge of
the depths of the wrongful conviction crisis, the goal of promoting just convictions arguably
weighs more heavily in the balance. The moment to reexamine federal habeas review is long
overdue.
A.

The Innocence Movement: An Overview

Since the dawn of forensic DNA testing in the early 1990’s, the Innocence Project,142
along with a network of comparable legal organizations across the country, have begun to unmask
the depth of the wrongful conviction crisis in the American criminal justice system. 143 The
pioneering work of these organizations has given rise to an Innocence Movement over the last
two decades.144 Specifically, Innocence Network organizations [“the Network”] have been
responsible for over 1500 exonerations. 145 Additionally, the Network has been responsible for
identifying the central factors giving rise to wrongful convictions and bringing about an array of
reforms in pretrial and investigatory procedures in our criminal justice system in response. 146 For
example, there have been widespread calls for reform relating to police eyewitness identification
procedures, police interrogations, and use of unverified forensic evidence since the dawn of the
Innocence Movement.147 However, success in achieving these reforms has been more gradual and
fragmented, with some states and local jurisdictions taking action more quickly than others. 148

those made in 1932”).
141

Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 67, at 4-22 (discussing the background of, and debate leading up to, the
passage of AEDPA).
142

The Innocence Project was established by attorneys Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld at Cardozo Law
School in New York City in 1992. See The Innocent Project, www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent (last visited Nov.
17, 2015).
143
See The Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/about-innocence-project/innocence-network (last
visited Nov. 17, 2015).
144

Hartung, supra note 15, at 69-72 (discussing the Innocence Movement and its impact on the American
criminal justice system).
145

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

146

See National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/miss

ion.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
147

Id.

148
For example, to date, three state appellate courts—New Jersey, Oregon, and Massachusetts—have been
instrumental in bringing about policy change regarding eyewitness identification procedures in their respective
jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878-879, 915-927 (N.J. 2011) (applying more expansive scrutiny
to police eyewitness identification procedures in response to social science research and Innocence Movement exoneration
data); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690-691 (2012) (revising admissibility standards for eyewitness identification
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The Innocence Movement has resulted in a greater focus on factual innocence in the
courtroom, and in legal education as well. 149 Further, significant media attention has focused on
wrongful convictions of the innocent in recent decades. 150 This emphasis on innocence issues—
termed “innocentrism” by Professor Daniel Medwed151—and the continued efforts to free actually
innocent, wrongfully convicted prisoners, have been characterized as “the new civil rights
movement.”152 In response to critics who are wary of an overemphasis on factual innocence in
criminal prosecutions,153 Professor Medwed has argued that “innocentrism” is a “positive
occurrence and one that ultimately can complement, rather than replace, the emphasis on
substantive and procedural rights.”154
B.

Pre-trial Reforms in Criminal Justice System

Most of the reforms stemming from the Innocence Movement have been adopted in the
pretrial context in response to factors identified as playing a significant role in wrongful
convictions, i.e., eyewitness identifications, coerced confessions, flawed forensics, and
prosecutorial misconduct.155 While the calls for reform have been widespread in the last two
decades, state courts and legislatures have been slow to respond. In fact, the success in bringing
about policy change in the realm of investigation and pre-trial procedure has been somewhat ad
hoc, and varies greatly from state to state.

evidence to reflect new understandings of unreliability in light of social science research trends); Commonwealth v.
Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015) (significantly expanding the scope of eyewitness identification jury instructions to
take into account new understandings of human memory based on social science research).
149

Daniel Medwed, Innocentrism, U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1549-50 (2008) (noting that recent focus on issues
of factual innocence in courtrooms, classrooms, and newsrooms “derives from the emergence of DNA testing and the
subsequent use of that technology to exoneration innocent prisoners”); see also Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Legal
Education in the Age of Innocence: Integrating Wrongful Conviction Advocacy into the Legal Writing Curriculum, 22
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 129 (2013) (discussing the critical role of wrongful conviction advocacy in legal education).
150

See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 149, at 1551 (discussing the proliferation of wrongful conviction themes
in media and pop culture).
151

Id.

152

See Press Release, Innocence Project, As 100th Innocent Prisoner is Freed by DNA Tests, Innocence
Network Convenes to Map the Future of “New Civil Rights Movement” in Criminal Justice (Jan. 17, 2002),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-project-press-release-100th-innocent-prisoner-freed-dna-tests-innocencenetwork-convenes-m.
153
See, e.g., Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 316-18
(2010) (arguing that emphasis on factual innocence in the wake of the Innocence Movement has overshadowed the
important work of defending the guilty).
154

Medwed, supra note 149, at 1549.

155

Bakken, supra note 1, at 838-39 (arguing that Innocence Movement reforms of criminal justice system
have primarily focused on pretrial procedural issues relating to police eyewitness identification and interrogation
procedures, and prosecutorial misconduct).
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Eyewitness Identification

The exoneration data stemming from the Innocence Movement has identified eyewitness
misidentification as the leading contributing factor present in wrongful convictions, with one or
more such identifications playing a role in more than 75% of the over 250 DNA exonerations that
have occurred.156 In response to this realization, state courts and legislatures around the country
have imposed new procedures.157 Specifically, courts have gradually begun to apply more
scrutiny to eyewitness identifications, and have imposed new procedures relating to eyewitness
identification, such as favoring blind administration by police and avoiding oral feedback to
witnesses.158 Additionally, police departments increasingly favor video recording of all
identification procedures, and the use of a single sequential photo lineup, rather than the
presentation of a simultaneous photo array.159 However, while reform of eyewitness identification
procedures has begun to take hold in a handful of states, these reforms fall short of a universal
change in the law.
2.

Police Interrogation Procedures

The prevalence of coerced confessions among the DNA exoneration pool has led to
comparable reforms of police procedures in this realm as well.160 Of the first 300 DNA
exonerations, 30% involved false confessions or guilty pleas. 161 In light of the prevalence of false
confessions in wrongful convictions of the innocent, courts increasingly favor videotaping of all
interrogation procedures where possible.162 Additionally, in the wake of extensive social science
156

See Innocence
Project,
misidentification (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).

www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-

157
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 915-927 (NJ 2011) (applying more expansive scrutiny to
police eyewitness identification procedures in response to social science research and Innocence Movement exoneration
data); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015) (relying on findings of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence report, court issued new jury instruction template, taking into account social
science research about the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification accounts).
158

See Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited Nov.
17, 2015) (recommending reforms to police eyewitness identification procedures, including blind administration of live
and photo line-up procedures, instruction to witnesses that perpetrator may not be present in line-up, and video recording
of all identification procedures).
159

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (NJ 2011) (applying more expansive scrutiny to police eyewitness
identification procedures in response to social science research and Innocence Movement exoneration data).
160

See Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Nov.
17, 2015) (discussing prevalence of coerced confessions DNA exoneration cases and citing to legislative and judicial
reforms).
161
See id. (“It seems unfathomable that someone would admit to committing a crime that they had nothing
to do with. But in more than 25 percent of the exonerations proven by DNA, that is exactly what happened.”).
162

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2013) (articulating judicial preference for
audio and/or video recording of police interrogations and entitling defense to a jury instruction explaining that a failure to
record can be viewed as evidence of foul play and a potentially involuntary confession).
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research on juvenile brain development and behavior, courts have continued to apply special
scrutiny to juvenile confessions.163 In particular, given the special susceptibility of juveniles to
coercive police practices, along with the diminished ability to appreciate the long-term
consequences of their decisions, courts have gradually begun to impose additional safeguards
against coerced and false confessions among juveniles. 164
Again, reforms relating to interrogation procedures are beginning to gain favor among
state courts and legislatures; yet these reforms have not had a universal impact on the criminal
justice system as a whole.
3. Unreliable Forensic Evidence

Finally, certain types of forensic evidence, such as bite marks, ballistics, and hair
comparisons, have been called into question as a result of the Innocence Movement’s exoneration
data.165 Although historically relied upon by prosecutors and courts as scientific evidence, these
types of comparisons yield unreliable results, given that the techniques have never been subjected
to the rigors of scientific analysis. 166 The exoneration data has revealed that faulty forensic
evidence—either unreliable methodology or deliberate falsification of results—has played a
substantial role in wrongful convictions to date, as well. 167 Indeed, unreliable forensic science
played a role in 52% of the first 250 DNA exonerations. 168 Specifically, in the wake of the
Innocence Movement, the National Academy of Sciences has published a report concluding that
an array of forensic methodologies historically relied upon to support criminal convictions, such
as hair comparison, ballistics, bite mark and arson analysis, are unreliable, and unsupported by
nationally-recognized scientific standards.169
Additionally, the FBI has recently undertaken a comprehensive review of all federal
163
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice,
97 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 219 (2006-2007) (analyzing social science research and quantitative and qualitative data on
juvenile brain development and discussing policy issues including video recording, length of interrogation, and use of
false evidence during questioning); Jennifer Walters, Illinois’ Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by
Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487, 515-21 (2002)
(discussing Illinois’ law requiring presence of counsel for all juvenile confessions).
164

Feld, supra note 163, at 223-28 (discussing more lenient recent legal frameworks to provide increased
safeguards for juveniles against self-incrimination).
165
See Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/unvalidated-orimproper-forensic-science (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (identifying forensic techniques such as hair miscroscopy, bite mark
comparisons, firearm tool mark analysis, and shoe print comparison as unreliable and untested by sufficient scientific
evaluation).
166

Id.

167

Id.

168

Daniel Medwed, Introduction: Path Forward or Road to Nowhere? Implications of the 2009 National
Academy of Sciences Report on the Forensic Sciences, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 221, 221 (2010) (discussing role of faulty
forensic evidence in DNA exoneration data).
169

Id. at 221-222 (discussing the significance of the 2009 Report of the National Academy of Sciences
[“NAS Report”], and noting that the NAS Report supports a conclusion that “there are problems with the manner in which
forensic science is (a) initially produced and (b) later presented as evidence in criminal trials.”).
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prosecutions in which hair comparison analysis was relied upon in securing the convictions. In
doing so, the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office have collectively recognized the fundamental
unreliability of—and lack of scientific support for—hair comparison evidence.170
C. Recalibrating the Policy Equation: Finality vs. Fairness in the Age of Innocence

While the Innocence Movement has been the impetus for an array of pre-trial and
investigatory reforms, discussed in Section IIB above, these measures have been adopted state by
state, with no national uniformity. Additionally, very few comparable reforms have occurred in
the post-conviction context, and even fewer in the federal realm. In fact, AEDPA, the legislation
passed to overhaul federal habeas corpus review of state convictions, was enacted before the
Innocence Movement was in full swing. 171
Thus, the debate leading up to the passage of AEDPA in 1996 focused on balancing the
competing interests of comity and finality on the one hand, and the interests of justice and fairness
on the other.172 Yet the exoneration data stemming from the Innocence Movement over the last
several decades warrants a recalibration of these underlying policy interests. At the time Congress
debated the provisions of AEDPA, the American criminal justice system was still widely regarded
as an error-free model for the world. Indeed, as of 1996, fewer than 30 known DNA exonerations
had occurred.173 Today, that number has expanded 50-fold, and it is widely understood that the
current exonerations represent the mere “tip of the iceberg” with thousands, if not tens of
thousands, of factually innocent prisoners remaining incarcerated.174
Surely the undisputed knowledge that our criminal justice system was, and is, subject to
a significant error rate, would have altered the congressional debate when AEDPA was enacted. It
is eminently reasonable, in the interest of judicial economy, comity, and finality, for there to be a
limit on the scope of review for a convicted prisoner. And in this vein, it is not surprising that
Congress sought to curtail federal habeas review to conserve resources, demonstrate respect for
state judgments, and curb what was widely regarded as rampant “abuse of the writ.”175 Given that
See Scientists Applaud FBI’s Decision to Review Reliability of Forensic Hair Analysis, MINTPRESS
NEWS, July 25, 2013, http://www.mintpressnews.com/scientists-applaud-fbis-decision-to-review-reliability-of-forensichair-analysis/165917/ (“The FBI said that in more than 2,000 cases from 1985 to 2000, analysts may have exaggerated the
significance of hair analyses or reported them inaccurately.”).
170

Hartung, supra note 15, at 69-70 (“While Congress sought to address the unrestricted filing of
‘frivolous’ federal habeas petitions by obviously guilty prisoners, the fact that significant numbers of these petitioners
were wrongfully convicted and factually innocent was not yet widely known and did not seem to enter the debate.”)
(citation omitted).
171

Id. at 68 (noting that AEDPA “ostensibly sought to balance the competing interests of finality and
fairness, by limiting the seemingly endless review of criminal judgments while ensuring a just result for the convicted.”).
172

173
See The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/casesfalse-imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_start=0&c4=Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
174
Medwed, supra note 149, at 1564 (referencing Sam Gross’ conclusion that the number of wrongful
convictions of the innocent is “unknown and frustratingly unknowable”); Rachel Pecker, Note, Quasi-Judicial Prosecutors
and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence: Granting Recusals to Make Impartiality a Reality, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609,
1612-13 (2013) (discussing the impact of the Innocence Movement and characterizing the excess of 2,000 exonerations
and 300 DNA exonerations as the “tip of the iceberg”).
175

See Reynolds, supra note 73, at 1478-79 (discussing political climate at the time AEDPA was enacted,
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conviction of the factually innocent was not explicitly discussed in the congressional hearings on
AEDPA, it can be presumed that the existence of a significant rate of wrongful convictions of the
innocent did not enter the debate.176
Today, nearly two decades after AEDPA’s passage, the crisis of wrongful convictions in
the United States cannot be ignored. In this era, with full knowledge of the exoneration data
stemming from the Innocence Movement, it is difficult to imagine how Congress would pass
legislation that operates to virtually foreclose claims of innocence. While viable innocence claims
were once considered an anomaly, they are now known to occur far more frequently than was
ever imagined. In light of this new reality, the appropriate scope of federal review must be
revisited. Further, given the inability of pretrial procedural reforms to fully address and correct the
wrongful convictions crisis, a systemic reform of federal habeas review is warranted.
III. PRE-TRIAL INNOCENCE TRACKS: THE PROPOSAL AND THE CRITIQUE

While no legal scholar has proposed a federal post-conviction innocence track since the
passage of AEDPA, some have proffered a comparable innocence track in the pretrial context.177
The pretrial innocence track model laudably seeks to provide well-deserved protections for
actually innocent defendants; yet this model raises practical concerns and has failed to gain
traction.178
A.

The Pretrial Innocence Track Proposal

Although not yet implemented in any jurisdiction, several legal scholars have proposed
the establishment of an optional “innocence track” or “innocence bureau” which would present an
alternative to the traditional trial track.179 This model is premised on the notion that factually
innocent criminal defendants require procedures specifically designed to separate them from the
large majority of defendants who are factually guilty.180 While the specifics of this model vary
with national security at the forefront of the congressional agenda, along with concerns about federal courts “besieged by”
habeas petitions); Hartung, supra note 15, at 69 (noting that, in passing AEDPA, “Congress sought to address the
unrestricted filing of ‘frivolous’ federal habeas petitions by obviously guilty prisoners.”).
176

See Ritter, supra note 13, at 72 (noting that most congressional debate leading up to the passage of
AEDPA focused on provisions relating to terrorism, wiretapping, and immigration, with very little discussion of the postconviction measures).
177
See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence into
Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 893-94 (2011) (advocating for pre-trial
innocence track as a measure to protect against wrongful convictions).

Id. at 871 (noting that “the defense bar may fear that some reforms will bring new disadvantages to the
majority of their clients (the factually guilty ones) for the benefit of the innocent minority.”).
178

179
See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 911, 920-23 (2011) (discussing “innocence procedures” proposed by legal scholars, including Tim Bakken,
Lewis Steel and Michael and Lesley Risinger); see also Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 893-94 (advancing a
proposal allowing for a defendant to “elect between two tracks [, the factual innocence track and the traditional track]
which would determine both the structure of further pretrial proceedings and the rules by which the trial itself would be
conducted.”).
180

Bakken, supra note 1, at 839 (“Innocent persons need procedures to separate themselves from the large
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among the various legal scholars who have proposed it, the approach allows criminal defendants
to opt into a pretrial “innocence track” in exchange for relinquishing fundamental constitutional
protections, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.181
Specifically, those who opt into the innocence track would have the benefit of enhanced
investigation procedures and a higher burden of proof imposed on the prosecution, 182 and would
be entitled to an acquittal upon evidence that the government acted in bad faith. 183 In exchange,
the defendant would agree to testify at trial and be available for a formal pretrial deposition before
the trial judge.184 Under this proposed innocence track, the defense would also be entitled to full
access to the prosecution’s files, pursuant to an open discovery provision.185
This model further envisions a certain streamlining of the process. Specifically, prior to
trial, the defendant would identify the “binary issues of fact upon which his factual guilt or
innocence turns”186—i.e., identity of the perpetrator—and would concede uncontested issues such
as the perpetrator’s state of mind or intent.187 Finally, under this model, the role of crime
investigation would be shared and would not fall exclusively within the purview of the
prosecution.188 Presumably, this option would help separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff,
in order to identify the truly innocent defendants.
B. Criticism of Pretrial Innocence Tracks

While the pretrial innocence track proposal holds a superficial appeal in that it seeks to

majority of guilty persons in the justice system.”).
See, e.g., Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 894 (“The ‘factual innocence’ track would require the
defendant to make a limited waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, in that the defendant would commit himself
to testify at trial, and also make himself available for a formal pretrial deposition in front of, and to be conducted primarily
by, the judge.”).
181

182

Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial
System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 545, 549 (2008) (“The government would be required to prove guilt to a higher
standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
183

Id. at 550 (“Jurors could acquit the defendant upon finding that the government acted in bad faith.”).

Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 894 (“The ‘factual innocence’ track would require the defendant
to make a limited waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, in that the defendant would commit himself to testify
at trial, and also make himself available for a formal pretrial deposition in front of, and to be conducted primarily by, the
judge.”).
184

Id. at 887 (2011) (calling for “at the very least . . . discovery reform, including the adoption of reciprocal
so-called ‘open file’ discovery.”) (emphasis in original).
185

186

Id. at 894.

Id. (“The point of such a trial would be to try the one or two issues identified by the defendant as the
binary issues of fact upon which his factual guilt or innocence turns. The election would therefore operate as an admission
that the state of mind of the perpetrator was such as to qualify for conviction under the top count of the indictment.”).
187

188
Id. (“[A factual innocence track] would . . . , by eliminating the prosecution's virtual monopoly on
investigation, foster a true adversary system in which the adversaries concentrate on their epistemically valuable functions
of marshalling, explaining, and testing the implications of the facts, and not on producing, massaging, and malleating the
facts.”).
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apply necessary special scrutiny to claims of innocence, a closer examination reveals significant
practical concerns. In fact, pretrial innocence track proposals have been met with criticism in the
legal scholarship from all sides. For example, some legal scholars and prominent prosecutors have
argued that such an approach would result in freeing the guilty with a slim possibility of doing
much to aid the truly innocent.189 Specifically, Professor Paul Cassell has argued that such special
procedures are implausible and not necessary to protect the innocent.190 For example, Cassell
asserts that the prosecution could rarely meet a burden higher than the standard “beyond a
reasonable doubt” applied in criminal trials.191 Cassell further argues that the innocence track
model lacks an effective method of preventing factually guilty defendants from invoking the
procedures.192 Professor Tim Bakken rebuts Cassell’s argument regarding false claims of
innocence, and asserts that “[t]he last thing any guilty person wants to promote is the collection of
all evidence.”193
On the other side, detractors from the defense bar have argued that pretrial innocence
tracks are not viable because participation necessarily depends on defendants relinquishing their
constitutional rights.194 For example, compelling a defendant to waive his or her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination would arguably result in a presumption that those
defendants not choosing the innocence track declare their guilt by default. 195 This approach would
run afoul of the presumption of innocence as well. Notably, if this procedure were to ever become
widely administered, jurors would find themselves in the position of determining guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with the implicit knowledge that the defendant had opted not to declare factual
innocence.196 This approach seems irreconcilable with any meaningful interpretation of the
presumption of innocence.197
Additionally, some pretrial innocence track proposals require that defense counsel

189

See, e.g., Bakken, supra note 1, at 847 (discussing Paul Cassell’s criticism of pretrial innocence track

proposal).
190

Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical Observations on
Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2011/12) (disputing the need for additional
pretrial and trial measures to protect innocent defendants).
191

Id.

192

Bakken, supra note 1, at 848 (discussing Cassell’s opposition to the pretrial innocence proposal).

193

Id.

194

See, e.g., Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 894 (noting that pre-trial innocence tracks necessarily
require waiver of constitutional rights); see also Hartung, supra note 15, at 86 (noting likelihood of opposition from
defense bar given that this approach “would have the de facto effect of dividing criminal defendants into two definitive
camps: those who admit their guilt and those who do not.”).
195

Id.

196

Although there is a distinction to be made between a defendant claiming factual versus legal
innocence—with the former eligible to opt into the innocence track, but not the latter—this distinction may be lost on a
jury. For example, a defendant disputing the requisite intent in a murder case, but not the identity of the perpetrator, would
be no less entitled to an acquittal in spite of being precluded from the innocence track. Nonetheless, a jury might conclude
that such a defendant falls outside the “innocence track” and thus, reach an unsupported guilty verdict.
See, e.g., Bakken, supra note 1, at 845-46 (noting that under innocence procedures “defendants could
compel enhanced investigations by waiving the right to remain silent and agreeing to an interview.”).
197
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submit an affidavit affirming a personal belief in her client’s factual innocence.198 Thus, the
enhanced investigation and other innocence track protections would not take place until after such
an affidavit was submitted.199 This approach would seem to run counter to an array of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel protections. Specifically, the requirement of an “innocence
affirmation” would improperly place defense counsel in the simultaneous role of defense attorney,
prosecutor, judge, and jury.
For example, requiring an attorney to publically state his or her opinion as to a client’s
innocence would flagrantly violate the attorney-client privilege, as presumably, such a declaration
would depend at least in part on what the defendant reported to his or her attorney during their
consultations. Further—and perhaps even more problematically—an attorney’s failure to file such
an affidavit would, by default, arguably amount to a public statement of belief in the client’s
factual guilt, or, at a minimum, a lack of confidence in the client’s factual innocence. This
approach would no doubt create conflict in the attorney-client relationship as well, particularly
where the attorney is unwilling to file an affirmation of innocence.
For all these reasons, the pretrial innocence track model has yet to be implemented in
any U.S. jurisdiction, and seems unlikely to be adopted any time in the near future.
IV. THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION INNOCENCE TRACK

Unlike the proposed pre-trial innocence track discussed in Part III above, a federal postconviction innocence track would more effectively achieve the goals of accuracy in criminal
convictions and substantive justice, without running counter to fundamental constitutional rights.
This approach would also further the original purpose of the Great Writ. 200 In addition, a
comprehensive reexamination of federal habeas review and imposition of a post-conviction
innocence track would help bring about the systemic change absent from the Innocence
Movement reforms achieved to date.
Federal habeas review, in the wake of AEDPA, is widely regarded as an unmitigated
disaster.201 Indeed, there is support for the argument that federal habeas procedure is well past due
for an overhaul.202 The pretrial procedural reforms stemming from the Innocence Movement,
discussed in Part IIB above, are a promising step in the right direction, but lack uniformity among
the states.203 Further, there is a decided lack of uniformity among state post-conviction procedures
as well.204 Thus, a petitioner raising a post-conviction claim of actual innocence is likely to
Id. at 848 (noting that, under the innocence track approach, “defense attorneys would have to affirm
their clients’ innocence by submitting an innocence affirmation.”).
198

199

Id.

Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that “nowhere is the remedial role of habeas so
important as in the case of an innocent person.”).
200

201

Yackle, supra note 16, at 553 (commenting that federal habeas corpus review for state prisoners is an
“intellectual disaster area”).
202
Id. (acknowledging that AEDPA has failed to effectively restructure federal habeas review, and
advocating for the need to “start over”).
203

See supra notes 155-70, and accompanying text.

204
See Medwed, supra note 135, at 681 (discussing the array of “current modes of collateral relief” in the
state post-conviction realm).
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receive disparate results depending on the jurisdiction where the underlying conviction
occurred.205 For this reason, a larger scale reform of the federal habeas review process—
universally available to all prisoners convicted in state courts—is a more effective way to bring
about systemic change.
What’s more, to the extent that these pretrial reforms stemming from the Innocence
Movement have been successfully implemented, they essentially operate as preventative measures
to avoid wrongful convictions of the innocent in the future.206 On the other hand, reforming
federal habeas procedures for petitioners raising claims of innocence would help solve a different
problem: correcting wrongful convictions that have already occurred. Both kinds of reform are
necessary to meaningfully address the wrongful convictions crisis.
A.

Historical Support for a Federal Post-Conviction Innocence Track

In the decades leading up to the Due Process Revolution of the 1950’s and 60’s, federal
habeas courts routinely failed to differentiate between innocence and non-innocence claims.207
This approach was logical at a time when the only viable habeas corpus claims were based on due
process claims of an erroneous verdict.208 However, today, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
years of expansive interpretation of due process, an array of constitutional claims exist which are
completely unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. 209 Thus, in modern jurisprudence, actual
innocence plays “only a small role” in adjudication of habeas corpus petitions.210
Decades before AEDPA was enacted, a debate ensued among legal scholars as to the
appropriate scope and focus of federal habeas review. 211 In spite of the “small role” that
innocence claims were recognized to play in federal review of state convictions, over the last
several decades, legal scholars have continued to emphasize the “primacy of innocence” in habeas
corpus jurisprudence.212
1. Friendly Article

In 1970, Judge Henry Friendly wrote an influential article, arguing that the Great Writ
205
206

Id.
See generally supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.

207

Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 87-88 (discussing how the types of constitutional challenges have
greatly expanded in the decades following the “due process revolution” at the hands of the Warren Court).
208

Id. at 88.

KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 111, at 10 (“The Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, responded to recurring and serious injustices inflicted upon state criminal
defendants—especially minorities and the poor—by interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
require the states to provide defendants with various new federal rights.”).
209

210

Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 92.

211

See generally supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.

212

See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 127, at 142 (arguing that federal habeas review of state convictions should
focus exclusively on innocence claims); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5 (proposing pre-AEDPA “innocence track” in
federal post-conviction context).
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had strayed from its original purpose and that federal habeas corpus review should focus
exclusively on claims of actual innocence. 213 Judge Friendly’s argument appeared to be premised
on the notion that the number of federal habeas petitions filed each year had reached
unmanageable levels, and a focus on exclusively innocence petitions would dramatically reduce
the number of filings while devoting the courts’ limited resources to the most deserving
petitioners.214
Although not explicitly stated, Judge Friendly’s premise that actually innocent prisoners
were exceedingly rare, if not virtually nonexistent, provided the undercurrent for his argument.
Indeed, his proposal seemed to rely on notions of judicial economy—i.e., that restricting petitions
to colorable claims of actual innocence would significantly limit the number of filings. 215 Yet,
when Judge Friendly wrote this article, he could not have foreseen the depth of the wrongful
conviction crisis to be revealed by the Innocence Movement in the decades to come.216
2. Hoffmann & Stuntz Article: The Original “Innocence Track” Proposal

Subsequently, in 1993, Professors Joseph Hoffmann and William Stuntz advocated for
an “innocence track” in federal habeas procedure, where review of such claims would be de novo
and relief could be based solely on a “naked innocence claim,” even if unaccompanied by a
separate constitutional claim.217 In their influential article, Habeas After the Revolution,
Hoffmann and Stuntz argued that an innocence track would serve to promote the dual purposes of
federal habeas review: 1) the protection of the innocent, and 2) deterrence of constitutional
violations by police, prosecutors, and judges.218
Hoffmann and Stuntz further discussed the notion that innocence claims should be
treated differently than non-innocence claims in habeas proceedings.219 Indeed the crux of their
proposal was that habeas law should be premised, at least in part, “on the recognition that habeas
can provide a valuable layer of protection against the unjust punishment of innocent
defendants.”220 In support of their argument, the authors cited Stone v. Powell, where the Supreme
Friendly, supra note 127, at 142 (arguing that “with a few important exceptions, convictions should be
subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional pleas with a colorable claim of
innocence.”).
213

214
Id. at 144 (arguing that the number of federal habeas petitions was overwhelming the courts as of 1970,
“compris[ing] the largest single element in the civil caseload of the [federal] district courts”); see also David Wolitz,
Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1038 (2010) (noting that Judge
Friendly’s proposal placed “greater emphasis on actual innocence over procedural violations,” thus resulting in more
“attention on the most deserving petitioners”).

Friendly, supra note 127, at 148 (commenting that the “most serious single evil with today’s
proliferation of . . . [federal habeas petitions] is its drain upon the resources of the community—judges, prosecutors, and
attorneys appointed to aid the accused”).
215

216

Id. (characterizing federal habeas petitions as a “gigantic waste of effort”).

217

Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 96-97.

218

Id. at 108 (discussing dual purpose of federal habeas review).

219

Id. at 85 (citing to Stone v. Powell for support for the proposition that innocence claims should be
differentiated from other constitutional claims).
220

Id. at 95.
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Court determined that Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues were not appropriate claims
under federal habeas corpus, partly given that they were unrelated to guilt or innocence.221
Additionally, the authors argued that the historical focus on federalism in the habeas
debate is outdated, and that instead, the debate should focus on how federal habeas procedures are
part of the criminal justice system, rather than a separate entity.222 Specifically, the authors argued
that federal habeas review should be viewed as a critical part of the criminal justice system, rather
than merely as an ancillary constitutional review, along of the lines of a § 1983 federal civil rights
claim.223 Hoffmann and Stuntz asserted that, in furtherance of the goals of “protecting innocence,
deterring unreasonable state court decision making, and providing sufficient opportunities for
federal lawmaking,” federal habeas procedures should be reformed.224
Under Hoffmann and Stuntz’s proposal, eligibility for the innocence track would require
a petitioner to make a threshold showing of a “reasonable probability of innocence.”225 Further, a
petitioner filing any federal habeas claim would be eligible, regardless of whether the claim is
otherwise subject to procedural default.226 Thus, the petitioner could obtain habeas review of the
constitutionality of the convictions by demonstrating: (1) a “reasonable probability” of factual
innocence, and (2) the occurrence of a “constitutional violation” caused the erroneous
conviction.227
Hoffmann and Stuntz envisioned that this approach would lead to habeas review on the
merits of all claims relating to the failure of the government to disclose material evidence, along
with innocence-related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficiency of
evidence.228 The authors reasoned that the “reasonable probability” standard essentially amounted
to the same standard as those required for these constitution-based claims.229 This approach was
designed to benefit habeas petitioners raising claims of actual innocence because it would operate
to waive any potential procedural default. 230 In their article, Hoffmann and Stuntz argued that the
221

Id. at 92.

Id. at 122 (referring to the federal habeas corpus debate as “sterile” and arguing that it is “time to change
the terms of the discussion”).
222

Id. at 70 (“The categorization of habeas as a member of the class of federal remedies for constitutional
violations by state and local officials is not wrong; on the contrary, it is both correct and important. But it is also
misleading, for habeas is part of another system as well—the criminal justice system. And the criminal justice system is
quite different, substantively and procedurally, from the other settings in which federal constitutional law is enforced
against state and local actors.”).
223

224

Id. at 123.

225

Id. at 95.

226

Id.

227

Id.

Id. at 95-96 (“Our approach would lead to habeas review on the merits of all claims that the government
failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence, since our proposed ‘reasonable probability of innocence’ standard is the
same as that for showing ‘materiality’ under existing Brady doctrine. It would also mean habeas review of all innocencerelated ineffective assistance of counsel claims: once again, the standard is the same. And it would mean habeas review of
all Jackson v. Virginia claims, which go directly to the sufficiency of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”).
228

229

Id. at 95.

230

Id. at 96 (“The contrary rule in existence today rests on the notion that the state’s interests in finality and
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existing approach under federal habeas law reflected an emphasis on finality of state judgments
over the interest of correcting wrongful convictions of the innocent. 231 Finally, Hoffmann and
Stuntz emphasize that their model is rooted in the fundamental purpose of habeas review—i.e.,
preventing injustice—rather than correcting state courts.232
While the Hoffmann and Stuntz innocence track proposal contemplates coupling an
innocence claim with an allegation of a related constitutional violation, their approach also allows
for a “‘naked’ innocence claim” of the type raised in Herrera v. Collins.233 The authors
acknowledge that such a bare claim of innocence would potentially require a higher standard of
proof.234 While the proposal does not definitively set a proposed standard of establishing
innocence under these circumstances, the authors contemplate a “more likely than not” or “clear
and convincing evidence” standard.235
However, in proposing a federal habeas innocence track in 1993, Hoffmann and Stuntz
could not have foreseen the wreckage that AEDPA would bring to bear just three years after the
publication of their article. While the authors recommended taking steps to ensure greater
protection for petitioners raising claims of actual innocence, the passage of AEDPA in 1996 had
exactly the opposite impact.236
B.

The Inability of State Post-Conviction Procedures to Adequately Address Actual Innocence Claims

Given that AEDPA has operated to severely curtail federal habeas review of state
convictions, state collateral review of a conviction now amounts to the only viable venue for
constitutional review of one’s convictions.237 Indeed, some scholars have argued that federal
review of state convictions is no longer warranted because state post-conviction review
procedures are effective in addressing viable claims of actual innocence. 238 However, no proof
the enforcements of procedural rules outweigh the interest of a potentially innocent defendant in avoiding punishment.
This balance . . . reflects the current law’s preoccupation with federalism concerns, a preoccupation that is out of place
with the wholly nationalized body of law that state courts apply to resolve criminal procedure disputes.”).
231
Id. (commenting that “the goal of habeas relief on this ‘innocence track’ is not to send signals to the state
courts but to prevent injustice to the defendant”).

Id. at 95-96 (noting that the authors’ proposal would “provide a valuable layer of protection against the
unjust punishment of innocent defendants” and “would justify habeas review of the merits of the defendant’s federal
claims without regard to any possible procedural deficiencies”).
232

233
Id. at 97 (noting that “we would not preclude habeas relief even for a ‘naked’ innocence claim of the
kind that was presented to the Court . . . in Herrera v. Collins [113 S Ct 853 (1993)]”).

Id. at 97-98 (recognizing that “there is much room for disagreement about what the proper standard for
such ‘naked’ innocence claims ought to be”).
234

Id. at 98 (noting that “presumably it should be harder for a defendant to obtain habeas review by
claiming innocence alone than by coupling an innocence claim with a claim of constitutional violation” and suggesting
“more likely than not” innocence or “clear and convincing evidence” of innocence as possible standards).
235

236

See generally supra notes 27-82 and accompanying text.

See Medwed, supra note 135, at 681 (discussing “current modes of collateral relief” in the state postconviction realm); see also Williams, supra note 6, at 920 (noting the failure among state courts to provide meaningful
review of state convictions, especially in capital cases).
237

238

See Blume, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing views of “habeas detractors” who regard “punishing and
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exists that this is the case.
Most states now provide for some procedure for collateral attack of a conviction, such as
state habeas corpus or coram nobis.239 These procedures may be based on common law or, more
frequently, codified in statute or court rule.240 However, the effectiveness of these state postconviction procedures in identifying meritorious claims of actual innocence is not clear. Indeed,
studies suggest that state habeas proceedings fail to adequately remedy constitutional errors
occurring at the trial level.241 For example, a Texas study concluded that state post-conviction
decisions were primarily copied verbatim from government briefs in 83.7% of state habeas
cases.242
Further, state habeas and other post-conviction procedures have been criticized as
duplicative and unnecessarily complex. 243 Particularly in jurisdictions where these measures
coexist with motion for new trial procedures, the multiple layers of relief available can result in
conflicting standards, and can ultimately cause confusion among litigants.244
These inefficiencies, and the apparent failure of state court collateral review of
convictions to adequately identify and address viable claims of innocence, support the need to
strengthen federal habeas procedures, rather than abandon them.245 While some legal scholars
have argued that federal habeas review of state convictions is no longer necessary in the modern
era, where states are well-equipped to handle their own post-conviction review processes,246 it is
difficult to gauge how successful state courts actually are in undertaking these review measures
on their own.
For example, under AEDPA, § 2254(d)(2) provides a mechanism for litigating
procedural unfairness in state post-conviction procedures when a state court decision is “based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts.”247 Yet given that many states, such as California,
controlling crime as . . . a quintessential state function”).

See Medwed, supra note 135, at 681 (discussing “current modes of collateral relief” in the state post-

239

conviction realm).
240
Id. (noting this “shift from common law systems of state post-conviction relief in favor of statute- and
rule-based regimes”).
241
See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 42, at 366 (discussing high error rates in state capital cases, and noting
that errors often go uncorrected in state post-conviction procedures).
242

Texas Defender Service, A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death Penalty, Chapter 8, 127,
available at: http://texasdefender.org/tds-publications/.
Medwed, supra note 135, at 696 (“While the presence of multiple remedies at the state court level may
seem desirable or at least better than the alternatives, a single option or no remedy at all, the interrelationship between
these devices within any given jurisdiction can be perplexing.”).
243

244
Id. (discussing Tennessee state post-conviction procedures in particular, and identifying conflict between
requirements for introducing new evidence via motion for new trial versus post-conviction relief).
245

Marceau, supra note 16, at 198 (arguing that rather than abandoning federal oversight of state
convictions, federal oversight should be reoriented “so that it serves, at the very least, the critical function of ensuring the
fairness of the state process”).
246

See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.

247

See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
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deny thousands of habeas petitions per year through summary dispositions, it is impossible to
determine how often state courts determine the facts or interpret the law in an unreasonable
manner.248
C. Need for Continued Federal Oversight of State Court Convictions

While federal habeas review is controversial, there is broad support for the notion that
review and enforcement of federal constitutional rights should not be left exclusively to the state
courts.249 The original rationale for federal habeas review—i.e., the notion that federal courts are
better equipped to interpret federal constitutional rights—applies with equal force today.250
One prominent federal habeas scholar, Professor Larry Yackle, has argued in favor of the
“enduring idea that federal rights implicated in criminal cases should not be left to state courts
alone,” because these “courts may answer in ordinary civil litigation when federal issues emerge,
but not when the safeguards drawn from the Bill of Rights are at stake.”251 In support of his
argument, Professor Yackle looks to the historic rationale for federal habeas corpus review: the
notion that federal courts are uniquely situated to act as the unbiased arbiters of federal
constitutional law.252
D. Need to Correct AEDPA’s Disproportionate Impact on Petitioners Raising Claims of Actual Innocence

As discussed in Part IB above, many of AEDPA’s provisions have had a
disproportionate impact on prisoners raising claims of actual innocence. For example, AEDPA’s
strict one-year filing period, in combination with its limitation on second and successive petitions,
operates to foreclose petitions raising innocence claims.253 Indeed many such petitions are denied
based on threshold procedural violations, without ever reaching the merits of the issues raised. 254
Additionally, the exceedingly high standard required to show that newly discovered
evidence supports a finding of actual innocence erects onerous barriers to federal habeas review,
as well.255 Indeed, rather than establishing that new evidence supports a finding of innocence by a
preponderance of the evidence, as was historically required under federal common law, AEDPA’s
imposition of a gateway requirement of “clear and convincing evidence” of innocence has been

248

Marceau, supra note 16, at 154.

249

Yackle, supra note 16, at 553 (arguing that in modern society, the Supreme Court can no longer shoulder
alone the burden of review of federal constitutional rights for the state courts).
Id. at 556 (arguing that, unlike state courts, “federal courts . . . can concentrate on federal rights
unimpaired by any competing commitment to local criminal law”).
250

251

Id. at 559.

Id. at 556 (noting that, unlike state courts, “federal courts . . . can concentrate on federal rights
unimpaired by any competing commitment to local criminal law”).
252

253

See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.

Blume, supra note 4, at 286 (noting that “the total percentage of habeas corpus cases in the federal
courts of appeals that are disposed of on procedural grounds, as opposed to on the merits, has risen since 1997”).
254

255

See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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criticized as insurmountable.256 This high standard is problematic standing alone, but even more
so when viewed in light of AEDPA’s provisions eviscerating federal de novo review of state court
options.257 The combination of these provisions results in effectively foreclosing federal habeas
relief based on actual innocence.258
The irony of this disparate impact of AEDPA’s provisions is that the de facto victims—
the prisoners raising claims of actual innocence—are the intended beneficiaries of federal habeas
corpus review. Thus, in enacting AEDPA, rather than merely curing the perceived “abuse of the
writ,” Congress restricted access to federal habeas review so as to effectively foreclose relief for
the guilty and innocent alike. A radical restructuring of AEDPA is warranted to correct this
problem. As a starting point, creating a separate track for prisoners raising claims of innocence
would operate to focus the limited resources of the federal courts on the most deserving litigants.
V. FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION INNOCENCE TRACK: A PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK

The federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article provides a means of
addressing the shift away from the “primacy of innocence” in federal habeas jurisprudence since
the passage of AEDPA. In some respects, this proposal revives the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal
discussed in Part IV above. Although their proposal was raised over twenty years ago, Hoffmann
and Stuntz’ argument in favor of reform applies with even greater force today. Indeed, the events
of the last two decades since their proposal—the passage of AEDPA in 1996 and the Innocence
Movement’s impact on the criminal justice system in the years since—support the need for more
comprehensive and systemic federal habeas reform.
A federal post-conviction innocence track would operate to restore federal habeas corpus
to its historic purpose, by focusing judicial resources on petitioners raising viable claims of actual
innocence.259 The establishment of an innocence track in this context would restore the “primacy
of innocence” in federal habeas review,260 and would strike a more measured balance between the
completing interests of finality and fairness than the one achieved by the enactment of AEDPA.261
Finally, in contrast to the pretrial innocence track proposals, discussed in Part III above, 262 the
federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article would not require waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights.

256

Id.

257

Id.

258

Id.

See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence).
259

260

Id.

See Lott, supra note 71, at 456-57 (noting that critics characterize justice and fairness as “secondary
considerations” under the AEDPA).
261

262

See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
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A. Threshold Showing of Innocence

Participation in the federal post-conviction innocence track would involve a two-part
process. First, a petitioner would be required satisfy a threshold showing of innocence by a
preponderance of evidence in order to obtain a hearing. Next, once a hearing is ordered, a
petitioner would be required to satisfy a more onerous standard to obtain post-conviction relief.
This Article proposes that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard historically imposed by
common law,263 prior to the passage of AEDPA, is the appropriate threshold standard for
establishing factual innocence. Thus, in order to obtain a hearing, a petitioner seeking to opt into
the federal post-conviction innocence track would be required to show that new evidence supports
a finding that the petitioner was “probably factually innocent of the crime.” As Hoffmann and
Stuntz proposed in 1993,264 the innocence track proposed here contemplates either a “naked”
claim of innocence, or an innocence claim raised in conjunction with an allegation of a related
constitutional violation, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or a Brady claim.
While this new proposed standard represents a departure from the “clear and convincing”
standard imposed under AEDPA, the lower standard is warranted as a threshold showing in light
of the exoneration data from the Innocence Movement over the last twenty-five years. However,
under this proposal, once a hearing is ordered based on a showing of innocence by a
preponderance of evidence, the petitioner would then be required to establish innocence by the
more onerous “clear and convincing evidence” standard at the hearing. The two-part process of
review under the proposed federal post-conviction innocence track would help prevent
foreclosure of innocence claims on the merits, while at the same time limiting relief to the rare
occurrence where innocence is definitively established.
Had Congress been aware of the depth of the wrongful conviction crisis known today, it
arguably would have imposed a less onerous threshold standard for establishing innocence. Prior
to the enactment of AEDPA, the Supreme Court established a standard for raising claims of
innocence based on newly discovered evidence in Schlup v. Delo.265 This standard is consistent
with the Schlup standard, where the Court noted that “habeas corpus, at its core, is an equitable
remedy.”266 The Schlup court found that allowing federal habeas relief upon a petitioner’s
showing that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
innocent” is consistent with the purpose of federal habeas review of state court convictions. 267
Since its enactment, AEDPA has imposed a more onerous standard for raising claims of
innocence in the post-conviction context. Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a
petitioner’s claim for relief must be based on new evidence supporting the prisoner’s innocence
by “clear and convincing evidence.”268 Restoring the Schlup “preponderance of evidence”
standard as the threshold showing for a claim of innocence helps to achieve the desired balance
between the competing interests of finality and fairness. This standard also recognizes that
263

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (recognizing actual innocence as a gateway through which a
petitioner may pass a procedural bar and requiring a “more likely than not” standard to support a claim of innocence).
264

See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 263.
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Id. at 320.
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Id. at 328.
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Supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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wrongful convictions of the innocent occur at more significant rates than was known prior to the
Innocence Movement.
While this proposed standard is also lower than the one contemplated by Hoffmann and
Stuntz in their 1993 proposal, a lesser burden in establishing innocence is warranted in light of the
Innocence Movement and its impact on the criminal justice system. The Hoffmann and Stuntz
proposal was raised at a time when wrongful convictions of the innocent were believed to be
virtually non-existent. In that context, requiring such a high standard seemed appropriate, as the
contemplated remedy was only rarely imposed. Today, wrongful convictions of the innocent are
recognized are far more commonplace than what was believed in the early 1990s; thus, a less
onerous standard is warranted.
Even so, the preponderance standard is a difficult one for petitioners to meet, as it would
require prisoners to preliminarily demonstrate to the court that new evidence more likely than not
supports a finding of innocence. This standard is sufficiently onerous to prevent abuse by guilty
prisoners seeking to unjustly benefit from the innocence track. For example, a prisoner claiming
that a single witness had recanted his or her testimony would be insufficient to meet this standard
in most cases. As would a claim where the credibility of a prosecution witness had been
challenged by new evidence. The preponderance standard would require the reviewing court to
evaluate the new evidence in light of the strength of the evidence relied upon to convict the
defendant at trial.
Further, the imposition of the more onerous “clear and convincing” standard at the
second phase of the process would help address concerns about unduly expanding post-conviction
relief. Thus, federal review of a conviction would only be warranted where, as a whole, the
weight of the new evidence of innocence outweighs the evidence presented in support of the
underlying conviction. And post-conviction relief following a hearing would be granted even
more rarely, only in cases where the evidence of innocence is definitive.
B.

Exemption to Procedural Bars

The federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article also contemplates a
blanket exemption to procedural bars. Exempting prisoners from AEDPA’s procedural bars under
this model is consistent with the historic purpose of federal habeas corpus and the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence.269 Further, this approach is consistent with Hoffmann and Stuntz’s
innocence track proposal from 1993270—particularly in light of the subsequent passage of
AEDPA, and the considerable additional procedural barriers it imposed on federal habeas
petitioners.271 While Hoffmann and Stuntz envisioned a comparable waiver of procedural bars,
their proposal was raised in the pre-AEDPA era, when few such barriers were in place in the
federal realm. Indeed, the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal contemplated that prisoners raising
viable claims of factual innocence would not be subject to having their claims barred by state
procedural requirements or failure to fully exhaust their claims in state court. 272
269

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (recognizing actual innocence as a gateway through which a
petitioner may pass a procedural bar and requiring a “more likely than not” standard to support a claim of innocence).
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See supra notes 217-35 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
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Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5 at 96 (asserting that, under the authors’ proposed innocence track, a
prisoner who successfully raises a threshold claim of innocence would be entitled to review “without regard to any
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One-Year Limitations Period

The federal post-conviction innocence track would exempt participants from AEDPA’s
one-year limitations period. Since the passage of AEDPA, legal scholars have advocated for an
actual innocence exception to the one-year limitations period imposed under § 2244(d)(1). 273 This
approach recognizes the inherent challenges of post-conviction litigation, particularly where
actual innocence is raised. For example, federal habeas petitioners are incarcerated, and are
overwhelmingly acting in a pro se status, and there is a tendency for evidence of innocence to
emerge in an ad hoc fashion, bit by bit over time. 274
Thus, a prisoner could petition for federal habeas corpus review under the innocence
track whenever the new evidence of innocence presented itself, regardless of whether it occurred
within AEDPA’s one-year restriction. This approach would allow review of petitions on the
merits, based on actual innocence.
2.

Prohibition on Second and Successive Petitions

Under the federal post-conviction innocence track model, petitioners who satisfy the
gateway actual innocence requirement would also be exempt from the prohibition against second
and successive petitions imposed under AEDPA. Specifically, the “piecemeal problem” discussed
in Part VB1 above, supports an exemption from this procedural bar. 275 Prisoners acting in a pro se
status lack the training and experience of assigned counsel and face the uphill battle of piecing
together proof of innocence while incarcerated.276 Given these realities, each attempt by a prisoner
to access new information—whether to re-interview witnesses, locate physical evidence for
biological testing, or gain access to documents—is likely to be delayed, if not foreclosed.277
To further complicate matters, once a prisoner finally succeeds in gaining access to
potentially exonerating new evidence, AEDPA’s strict limitations period requires immediate
filing. The combination of these influences results in the need to file successive petitions in order
to get all the relevant information before the reviewing court.278 Again, exempting petitioners
from this procedural bar under the innocence track would result in greater numbers of viable
innocence claims being heard on the merits.

possible procedural deficiencies”).
See, e.g., Sussman, note 42, at 363 (criticizing AEDPA’s one-year limitations period as unreasonable,
particularly vis a vis petitions raising claims of actual innocence); see also Zheng, supra note 32, at 2103-07 (discussing
AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision as a radical departure from historical federal habeas jurisprudence and noting its
impact on petitioners raising claims of actual innocence).
273
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See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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Id.
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Id.

277
See Hartung, supra note 15, at 89-90 (identifying the “piecemeal problem” as a reality in federal habeas
litigation, and noting that “it is no surprise that when a pro se prisoner seeks federal habeas corpus review, the process is
likely to occur via multiple successive petitions, each raising a new ground for relief”).

See id. at 90 (noting that filing multiple federal habeas petitions “is not a tactic, or an abuse of the
system, but rather a necessity for a person acting alone to pursue a legal remedy while incarcerated”).
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Application of De Novo Review

Once the threshold is met, demonstrating that new evidence supports the petitioner’s
probable factual innocence, a petitioner seeking to opt into the federal post-conviction innocence
track would be entitled to de novo review of the underlying state conviction. Again, this approach
strikes a balance between the recalibrated policy interests of finality and fairness underlying the
AEDPA debate in the mid-1990’s. Specifically, allowing de novo review in this limited context
would provide for a more comprehensive (and admittedly more expensive) scrutiny in cases
where a legitimate issue of actual innocence has been raised.
And while de novo review is undoubtedly costly, and would impose significant demands
on limited judicial resources, it is difficult to argue that these financial concerns warrant keeping
innocent prisoners behind bars. Aside from the moral imperative supporting this approach, there
is a practical argument in favor of addressing wrongful convictions systemically and efficiently.
Finding a procedure that effectively brings wrongful convictions of the innocent to light will
prevent the imposition of astronomical civil settlements for wrongful conviction under state
compensation statutes.
The reality of post-conviction litigation is that, without counsel, incarcerated federal
habeas petitioners have the deck stacked against them and are unlikely to secure relief. 279 Over
twenty years ago, when Hoffmann and Stuntz proposed a federal habeas track in the pre-AEDPA
era, they argued that their approach would “greatly simplify habeas doctrine” and ultimately
would “protect many values, of which innocence is the most important.”280 The federal postconviction innocence track proposed in this Article would promote these values in a comparable
way, and at a time when they are under attack.
VI. CONCLUSION

The primacy of innocence in federal habeas jurisprudence is a concept that significantly
pre-dates AEDPA. Yet the passage of AEDPA has operated to eviscerate federal habeas review of
state court convictions for the innocent and guilty alike. This legislation was debated and enacted
before the Innocence Movement began in earnest, and has not been meaningfully re-examined
since. Now that the twenty-sixth anniversary of the first DNA exoneration is upon us, the time has
come to revisit federal habeas procedures. With the benefit of the exoneration data stemming
from the Innocence Movement, and a better understanding of the depths of the wrongful
conviction crisis in our criminal justice system, the competing interests animating the original
AEDPA debate must be recalibrated. Indeed, the interests of accuracy and substantive justice
weigh more heavily today against the competing interest of finality of criminal judgments. The
federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article would achieve a more measured
balance of these interests and would help bring about the systemic change historically absent from
the array of previous Innocence Movement reforms.

279
Hoffman & King, Opinion, supra note 115 (noting that “only a tiny fraction” of the 17,000 habeas
petitioners obtain any form of relief).
280

Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 99.
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